One by one, the dictactor which a puppet of shadow goverment (Freemason etc) after the colonize era, to make Islamic world stay weak and behind, now falling down.
The wave of Arab unrest that began with the Tunisian revolution reached Syri
a
on March 15, 2011, when residents of a small southern city took to the
streets to protest the torture of students who had put up
anti-government graffiti. The government responded with heavy-handed
force, and demonstrations quickly spread across much of the country.
By the late summer of 2012, the country was in a full-blown civil war. More than 21,000 people, mostly civilians, were thought to have died and tens of thousands of others had been arrested. By September 2012, 234,000 Syrian refugees had registered in neighboring countries — about half of whom left during August, while tens of thousands more have not registered. In addition, about 2.5 million Syrians needed aid inside the country, with more than 1.2 million displaced domestically, according to the United Nations.
Control of towns and cities seesawed between rebel forces that were poorly organized but increasingly well armed and confident, and a government that was too weak to stamp out the rebellion but strong enough to prevent it from holding territory.
The danger of the fighting setting off regional conflict seemed to rise with every month, with destabilizing effects seen in Lebanon and Iraq. But it was the possibility of a clash between Syria and its former ally Turkey that drew the most worry, particularly after Turkey shelled targets across the border in October 2012 after a Syrian mortar attack killed five of its civilians. Since Turkey is a Nato member, the fighting there could deepen international involvement.
President Bashar al-Assad, a British-trained doctor who inherited Syria’s harsh dictatorship from his father, Hafez al-Assad, had at first wavered between force and hints of reform. But in April 2011, just days after lifting the country’s decades-old state of emergency, he set off the first of what became a series of withering crackdowns, sending tanks into restive cities as security forces opened fire on demonstrators. In retrospect, the attacks appeared calculated to turn peaceful protests violent, to justify an escalation of force.
The conflict is complicated by Syria’s ethnic divisions. The Assads and much of the nation’s elite, especially the military, belong to the Alawite sect, a minority in a mostly Sunni country. While the Assad government has the advantage of crushing firepower and units of loyal, elite troops, the insurgents should not be underestimated. They are highly motivated and, over time, demographics should tip in their favor. Alawites constitute about 12 percent of the 23 million Syrians. Sunni Muslims, the opposition’s backbone, make up about 75 percent of the population.
By the late summer of 2012, the country was in a full-blown civil war. More than 21,000 people, mostly civilians, were thought to have died and tens of thousands of others had been arrested. By September 2012, 234,000 Syrian refugees had registered in neighboring countries — about half of whom left during August, while tens of thousands more have not registered. In addition, about 2.5 million Syrians needed aid inside the country, with more than 1.2 million displaced domestically, according to the United Nations.
Control of towns and cities seesawed between rebel forces that were poorly organized but increasingly well armed and confident, and a government that was too weak to stamp out the rebellion but strong enough to prevent it from holding territory.
The danger of the fighting setting off regional conflict seemed to rise with every month, with destabilizing effects seen in Lebanon and Iraq. But it was the possibility of a clash between Syria and its former ally Turkey that drew the most worry, particularly after Turkey shelled targets across the border in October 2012 after a Syrian mortar attack killed five of its civilians. Since Turkey is a Nato member, the fighting there could deepen international involvement.
President Bashar al-Assad, a British-trained doctor who inherited Syria’s harsh dictatorship from his father, Hafez al-Assad, had at first wavered between force and hints of reform. But in April 2011, just days after lifting the country’s decades-old state of emergency, he set off the first of what became a series of withering crackdowns, sending tanks into restive cities as security forces opened fire on demonstrators. In retrospect, the attacks appeared calculated to turn peaceful protests violent, to justify an escalation of force.
The conflict is complicated by Syria’s ethnic divisions. The Assads and much of the nation’s elite, especially the military, belong to the Alawite sect, a minority in a mostly Sunni country. While the Assad government has the advantage of crushing firepower and units of loyal, elite troops, the insurgents should not be underestimated. They are highly motivated and, over time, demographics should tip in their favor. Alawites constitute about 12 percent of the 23 million Syrians. Sunni Muslims, the opposition’s backbone, make up about 75 percent of the population.
